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In 1983 no more than 19% of all U.S. households owned any publicly trade-
able equity. While the share of stockholding households has since grown
dramatically, most publicly tradeable equity in the United States is owned
by a small fraction of households. As shown by Heaton and Lucas (2000b),
these households tend to be relatively wealthy and they also own a lot of pri-
vate, non-public (proprietary) capital from which they derive much of their
income.
These observations single out entrepreneurs — the proprietors of non-
corporate businesses — as a group of stock owners that may be particularly
interesting from an asset pricing perspective: the risks associated with pro-
prietary, non-corporate entrepreneurial activity are largely non-diversiﬁable.
Non-corporate businesses typically have no direct access to capital markets.
While proprietors may still be able to insure their income by smoothing ﬂuc-
tuations in business cash-ﬂow through bank loans, small business access to
credit markets is also likely to be limited, due to moral hazard and adverse
selection or due to institutional barriers.
At a theoretical level, an increase in non-diversiﬁed idiosyncratic risk (also
referred to as ‘background risk’) will tend to lower demand for risky assets.
So, if — for whatever reason — stock market participation is limited so that
proprietors own a large share of the stock market, then ﬂuctuations in entre-
preneurial background risk could drive expected stock returns. The impact
of limited participation on the size of the equity premium has been studied
in e.g. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and Polkovnichenko (2004). The role of
non-insurable risk in asset pricing has been formalized in work by Constanti-
nides and Duﬃe (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1996, 2000a). Heaton and Lucas
(2000b) highlight the empirical role of entrepreneurial background risk for
stock returns by demonstrating that ﬂuctuations in aggregate proprietary
income help explain the cross-section of stock returns.
This paper examines the empirical relevance of this mechanism in explain-
ing stock returns over time. My main result is that, over the postwar period,
cyclical ﬂuctuations in proprietary income have been a good predictor of stock
returns. I also document that — in accordance with the theoretical mechanism
— the predictive power of proprietary income for stock markets has declined
since the beginning of the 1980s as stock market participation has started to
widen with the advent of tax-deferable employer-sponsored pension plans and
as proprietary income risk has become more easily diversiﬁable in the wake
of state level bank deregulation. Finally, I show that cyclical ﬂuctuations in
aggregate proprietary income are correlated with cross-sectional measures of
idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk. These ﬁndings provide strong support for
1the empirical importance of the entrepreneurial income risk mechanism in
explaining post-war U.S. stock market data.
The paper contributes to a growing body of empirical literature that doc-
uments that asset prices do not only have important temporary components
but that these temporary components are predicted by theoretically founded
macroeconomic variables. In particular, my empirical framework builds on
the studies by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) who have shown that
an empirical approximation of the consumption wealth ratio, the cay resid-
ual, has considerable forecasting power for excess equity returns at short to
medium horizons.
While the results obtained by Lettau and Ludvigson are consistent with
a wide class of theoretical models, they are silent about a particular theo-
retical explanation for the predictability of the equity premium. This paper
explores empirically to what extent a particular mechanism — idiosyncratic
background risk in entrepreneurial income coupled with limited participa-
tion in stock markets — can help to explain why the consumption wealth
ratio predicts stock market returns.
The empirical analysis in this paper interprets proprietary income as the
dividend to non-corporate entrepreneurial wealth. This allows me to obtain
an alternative empirical characterization of the consumption-wealth ratio as
a cointegrating relationship between consumption (c) and a weighted average
of proprietary income (p) and income derived from other sources (y).
This cointegrating relationship — to which I refer as the cpy-residual —
mainly reﬂects temporary variation in proprietary income and it is highly
correlated with the cay-residual, as identiﬁed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001,
2004). Very much as cay,t h ecpy residual outperforms other standard pre-
dictors of (excess) stock returns such as the dividend price ratio and the
payout ratio at relatively short horizons. While cpy cannot outperform cay
as predictor of excess returns at short to intermediate horizons, it performs
considerably better at horizons between 3 and 6 years.
Clearly, proprietary income could be correlated with stock returns for rea-
sons that have nothing to do with the non-insurable background risk mecha-
nism that motivates the analysis here: proﬁts by corporate and non-corporate
businesses may comove over the business cycle. As ﬁnancing conditions vary
over the business cycle, so could corporate retained earnings (Gertler and
Hubbard (1993)). Indeed, my results suggest that proprietary income pre-
dicts corporate dividends over the business cycle. But the predictive power
of proprietary income for excess returns on stocks by far exceeds what can
be explained by time-variation in dividends. Furthermore, proprietary in-
come has only very limited forecasting power for corporate earnings. Finally,
the interpretation of cpy as a distress factor capturing idiosyncratic entre-
2preneurial risk is supported by the fact that it is highly correlated with the
cross-sectional variance of state-level proprietary income growth.
The set of ﬁndings presented in this paper is consistent with the view that
over the sample period examined in this paper, 1952-2002, the proprietary
income mechanism has been quantitatively important in explaining asset
returns. But while entrepreneurial income risk accounts for a large fraction
of the explanatory power that the consumption wealth-ratio has for stock
returns, the link between the two variables is imperfect. At relatively short
horizons, the consumption-wealth ratio outperforms cpy as a predictor of
stock returns while at longer horizons the opposite is true. Furthermore, the
correlation between cpy and the consumption wealth ratio as a measure of the
cyclical component of stock markets has decreased over time. We empirically
link the decline in this correlation to two developments that started around
1980: ﬁrst, more households have begun to hold stocks and secondly, the
liberalization of bank branching regulation has led to the formation of bigger,
more eﬃcient banks and has facilitated the sharing of proprietary income
risk. These developments have aﬀected the very pillars of the entrepreneurial
background risk mechanism — limited participation and the presence of non-
insurable risk - that is the focus of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section,
I use the intertemporal budget constraint of the household sector to derive
a long-term (cointegrating) relationship between consumption and various
components of personal income, notably proprietary income. I then proceed
to the empirical analysis, identify the cointegrating relationship cpy in the
data and show that it mainly captures variation in proprietary income. I
then use the cointegrating error to forecast stock market returns, comparing
the outcome to the forecast performance of cay, the temporary component
of the consumption wealth ratio. In section ﬁve, I demonstrate that the
correlation between cpy and aggregate stock markets has decreased due to
widened stock market participation and better access of small ﬁrms to credit.
A ﬁnal section discusses the results and concludes.
2 Entrepreneurial income and the consumption-
wealth ratio
The analysis in this paper uses ﬁfty years of aggregate t i m es e r i e sd a t at oc o n -
struct an entrepreneurial risk or ‘distress’ factor by extending the approach
suggested by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) and Campbell and Mankiw
(1989). This approach has the advantage that it rests on minimal theoretical
3identifying assumptions since it is based solely on the log-linearization of the
average household’s intertemporal budget constraint. The log-linearization
allows me to derive a cointegrating relationship between the logarithms of
consumption (c), proprietary (p) and other forms of income (y). My interpre-
tation of this cointegrating relationship as an entrepreneurial risk factor rests
on the insight that if proprietary income is low in relation to other incomes
in the economy and in relation to aggregate consumption, then times for the
average entrepreneur are likely to be hard and entrepreneurial risk will be
high. Conversely, levels of proprietary income above the long-run trends in
income and consumption will reﬂect periods of low entrepreneurial risk. I
discuss and empirically underpin this interpretation in detail below. Before,
I turn to deriving the cointegrating relationship from the budget constraint
of the average household.
2.1 A long-run relation between consumption and the
dividends from wealth
For the purposes of this paper, I ﬁnd it useful to state the budget constraint
of the average household in present-value form: I write total wealth, Ψt,a s
the sum of proprietary wealth Πt and other forms of wealth Θt:
Ψt = Πt + Θt (1)
where total wealth Ψt is the present value of consumption expenditures and
the right hand side gives the present value of all incomes, partitioned accord-
ing to whether this income is derived from proprietary entrepreneurial or
non-proprietary activity (wages and salaries, dividends). Letting lower case







= θt − ψt (2)
The share of proprietary wealth in total wealth is Πt/Ψt =e x p ( πt − ψt)
and I denote the long-run mean of Πt/Ψt with γ. Hence, I can write γ =
exp(π − ψ),w h e r eπ − ψ is the long-run mean of the logarithm of Πt/Ψt.I















(1−γ)−1 is a constant. Plugging this back
into (2) and rearranging yields
ψt − γπt − (1 − γ)θt = −(1 − γ)κ (3)
4This equation is the basis for the long-run relationship between consump-
tion and proprietary income that I am going to consider in this paper. The
logarithms of total, proprietary and non-proprietary wealth are not directly
observable. But the long-run relation between wealth and its sub-components
can be made observable by acknowledging that proprietary income is the div-
idend to proprietary wealth as any other form of income must be the dividend
of other (non-proprietary) forms of wealth. Ultimately, consumption is the
dividend on total wealth. The gist of my argument is that consumption,
proprietary income and labour income are all individually integrated of or-
der one (I(1)), but all three variables diﬀer from their respective permanent
values (i.e. from the respective wealth components) only by an I(0)-process.
Hence, replacing ψ, π,a n dθ in (3) with consumption (c), proprietary (p)a n d
non-proprietary income (y) respectively, one must obtain an I(0) process, so
that
cpyt = ct − γpt − (1 − γ)yt (4)
deﬁnes a cointegrating relationship. This cointegrating relationship is
more formally derived in the appendix. In analogy to Lettau and Ludvigson,
I refer to it via the acronym ’cpy’. An immediate empirical implication of
(4) is that the coeﬃcients of the cointegrating vector should correspond to
the long-run shares of proprietary and other wealth in total wealth.
By Granger’s representation theorem, the fact that c, p,a n dy cointegrate
also implies that their joint dynamics is captured by a vector error-correction
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is the cointegrating vector, α is a vector of
adjustment loadings, Γ(L) is a 3 × 3 matrix polynomial in the lag operator
and εt is a vector of disturbance terms. The error-correction mechanism
implies that at least one of the three variables consumption, labour, and
proprietary income have to adjust to restore cpy to its long-run mean. Hence,
c h a n g e si na tl e a s to n eo ft h et h r e ev a r i a b l e sw i l lh a v et ob ep r e d i c t a b l e ,i . e .
at least one of the variables will have a statistically signiﬁcant transitory
component. I provide ample evidence that cpy can indeed be associated with
the temporary component of proprietary income.
52.2 Interpreting cpy as a proxy of (idiosyncratic) en-
trepreneurial income risk
The theoretical mechanism that I wish to investigate rests on the presence
of non-diversiﬁed idiosyncratic risk at the household level. While household
level data are available from various sources, the sample period covered by
these data sets at best reaches back to the early 1980s and the data are at an
annual frequency. To contribute to the recent literature on the predictability
of stock returns, it is clearly desirable to use long stretches of quarterly data,
though. Furthermore — and the results of this paper underscore this point
— the roles of non-diversiﬁed entrepreneurial income risk in explaining asset
returns may have been more important in the more distant past than more
recently, because ﬁnancial innovation has allowed more (non-entrepreneur)
households to participate in stock markets and may — at the same time — have
given more entrepreneurs the possibility to lay oﬀ a part of their previously
non-diversiﬁable risk. Household level data for the 1950s and 1960s are,
however, not available.
Instead, I suggest to interpret cpy as a distress factor for the owners of
non-incorporated businesses. I will base this interpretation on two empirical
ﬁndings: ﬁrst, I show that mean reversion in cpy is mainly driven by propri-
etary income. Hence, cpy identiﬁes the temporary deviation of proprietary
income from its long-run relation with aggregate consumption and labour
income. My argument is that if proprietary income is low in relation to
aggregate consumption and other (i.e. non-proprietary) income, then idio-
syncratic risk for the average proprietor is high: when times are hard for the
average small business, then the average proprietor faces a relatively high
probability of having to liquidate private assets, e.g. in order to provide cash
ﬂow for the business. Proprietors will be afraid of having to liquidate public
equity holdings when prices are low. Therefore, to hold the outstanding stock
willingly, they will have to be compensated with high expected returns.
The second empirical ﬁnding that underpins the interpretation of cpy as
an entrepreneurial risk factor is that cpy is highly correlated with the cross-
sectional standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of proprietary
income growth at the state level. This suggests that cpy captures not only
the risk of the average proprietor relative to the average non-proprietor but
that it is also a good proxy of the idiosyncratic risk faced by each proprietor
relative to other proprietors.
63 Empirical implementation
3.1 Data
The data are quarterly data on personal income and its components from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Consumption data is from the same
source. The data range is from 1952Q1 to 2002Q2. I express income and
consumption in per capita terms and deﬂate both with the price index for
personal consumption expenditure (PCE). Details on all data used in this
paper and on their preparation are avaiable in the data appendix.
An important issue in the preparation of the data used for analysis is
the choice of consumption data. Since durables are consumed over several
periods total consumption is therefore likely to be a lot more variable than
the true consumption stream (relevant for utility maximization) that should
only include non-durables consumption and the stream of consumption ser-
vices from the stock of durables. Lettau and Ludvigson follow a convention
in the literature that measures consumption by expenditure on non-durables
excluding shoes and clothing and on services. This convention is justiﬁed un-
der the assumption that true logarithmic consumption is a constant multiple
of the logarithm of non-durables consumption.
However, as argued by Rudd and Whelan (2002), total consumption ex-
penditure should be used under the present empirical approach since what
matters for the intertemporal budget constraint is not the stream of consump-
tion services but just total expenditure on consumption: the present value
of total consumption has to be equated to the present value of the dividends
of wealth. I address this problem by using both total and non-durables and
services consumption (excluding shoes and clothing) in my empirical imple-
mentation. The results of the exercise will be discussed in the next section.
3.2 Cointegration analysis
To identify the number of cointegrating vectors, I used Johansen’s test pro-
cedures, the maximum eigenvalue and the trace test statistics. The results,
provided in table (1), clearly indicate the presence of one cointegrating rela-
tionship, irrespective of whether non-durables or total consumption is used.
I estimate the cointegrating vector in two ways: ﬁrst, based on Johansen’s
(1988) full information maximum likelihood approach and second based on
a cointegrating regression in the spirit of Engle and Granger (1987). Again,
the exercise is performed for both total consumption and for non-durable
consumption.
Shocks to income and consumption are likely to be correlated. While
7the full-information approach takes care of this problem, in the cointegrating
regression I account for it by applying Stock and Watson’s (1993) dynamic
OLS procedure which amounts toa d d i n gl e a d sa n dl a g so fﬁrst diﬀerences of
the regressors. Speciﬁcally, I estimate the following cointegrating relation:
ct − βppt − βyyt
Table 2 reports the estimated cointegrating vectors obtained from the
diﬀerent consumption data sets and based on both the full information and
the regression based method. The estimate of the cointegrating vector does
not depend on the choice of estimation method. It does, however, depend on
the choice of consumption data. While the coeﬃcient on proprietary income
is around 0.25 and around 0.75 on other income when total consumption is
used, both coeﬃcients increase slightly when non-durables consumption is
employed in the estimation. What can explain this diﬀerence?
Note ﬁrst that the sum of the coeﬃcients when total consumption is
used is exactly unity: this suggests that the net present value of proprietary
income accounts for 25 percent of total discounted incomes, other income
for the remaining three quarters. I will shortly discuss the plausibility of
these numbers further. But note ﬁr s tt h a tt h es u mo fc o e ﬃcients increases
by 8 percent if only non-durable consumption is used in estimation and this
increase falls almost equally on both coeﬃcients. One interpretation of this
is that the present value of durables consumption accounts for 8 percent of
the present value of total consumption. To gauge the plausibility of this
number, I examine what share of household net worth can be ascribed to
the stock of durable consumption goods. Data on the replacement value of
durables are contained in the household net worth data base from the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors. Inspecting these data reveals that over the
post-war period, the stock of consumer durables accounted for between 6-8
percent of household net worth. Hence, in the long-run the sum of proprietary
and non-proprietary wealth should exceed the present value of non-durable
consumption by roughly 6-8 percent, consistent with the results reported in
table 2.
The estimated cointegrating vectors suggest that the present value of
proprietary income amounts to about a quarter of the total present value
of consumption. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) ﬁnd that household ﬁnancial
wealth - i.e. the present value of all household cash ﬂow derived from capital
- accounts for roughly one third of total wealth in their cay relationship, in
line with standard estimates that put the capital share for the U.S. economy
at a very similar value. According to the National Income and Product
8Account (NIPA) Tables available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
proprietary income has accounted for only between one third and one half
of all proﬁts in the economy over the postwar period. But over the same
period, generally only around one third of all corporate proﬁts have been
disbursed as dividends. Since only disbursed dividends become a component
of household cash ﬂow (i.e. personal income), this suggests that proprietary
income could well account for around three quarters of all household cash
ﬂow derived from capital in present value terms. Hence an estimate for γ of
around 0.25 = (3/4 × 1/3) is consistent both with the evidence from U.S.
national accounting data and the ﬁndings by Lettau and Ludvigson.
The budget constraint (1) will hold irrespective of any particular economic
theory. This, in particular, implies that it should hold for total consumption
and the results just reported support this. But the theoretically correct
concept of consumption that should enter utility is unobservable since it
comprises the consumption services derived from the stock of durables. This
service stream will be a lot smoother than durables expenditure itself. It is
therefore a standard convention to proxy the theoretical consumption stream
by expenditure on non-durables and services alone. This is also the approach
adopted in Lettau and Ludvigson and I follow it here. In the sequel of
the paper, I will therefore only report results obtained with non-durables
consumption data. Speciﬁcally, in analogy to Lettau and Ludvigson, I refer
to the cointegrating residual via an acronym, as ’cpy’s ot h a t
cpy = ct − 0.27pt − 0.81yt
denotes temporary departures of consumption, proprietary and other income
from their common trends.
The main proposition I wish to make in this paper is that cpy can be
viewed as an indication of ﬂuctuations in entrepreneurial risk. This propo-
sition will be based on a set of empirical ﬁndings that I will document in
turn: ﬁrst, cpy is largely driven by ﬂuctuations in p so that I can interpret
cpy as the deviation of p from its trend: if proprietary income is low in
relation to aggregate consumption and to other forms of income, then the
average proprietor is in relative distress. Secondly, low values of proprietary
income (high values of cpy) are associated with a high cross-sectional vari-
ance of entrepreneurial income. Third, cpy is correlated with the aggregate
consumption wealth ratio and this is the case mainly because, fourth, cpy
predicts stocks markets.
I address the ﬁrst and last of these issues in the next subsections. Evi-
9dence on the correlation of cpy with the consumption wealth ratio and with
the cross-sectional variance of state-level income can be obtained from ﬁg-
ures (1) and (2). Figure (1) plots the cay residual from Lettau-Ludvigson
along with the cpy residual estimated here. It is well known from the results
in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) that virtually all temporary variation
in cay reﬂects ﬂuctuations in the stock of ﬁnancial wealth. Indeed the two
residuals share some of the major swings, but they are clearly not the same
time series. Their correlation across the sample period is only 0.47.T h e
comovement, however, seems a lot stronger in the earlier part of the sample.
Over 1952 to 1998, i.e. excluding the technology bubble, the correlation is
0.67. And including observations until 1980 only, the two time series ap-
pear particularly highly correlated with a coeﬃcient of around 0.8. Indeed,
the early 1980s seem to mark a break in the correlation between cpy and
cay that also highlights an important conceptual diﬀerence between the two
residuals: both cpy and cay are obtained from the log-linearization of what is
ultimately the same intertemporal budget constraint. But the empirical ap-
proximation of the consumption-wealth ratio is based on diﬀerent variables.
Whereas cay contains asset wealth, a, and is therefore a function of current
asset prices, asset price realizations do not feature in the computation of cpy.
The striking correlation between cpy and cay in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h es a m p l e
period and the subsequent decrease of this correlation would seem to suggest
an important change in the link between proprietary income, captured by
cpy and the transitory component of stock markets, as captured by cay.I
explore the changing structure of this link in more detail below.
Figure (2) plots cpy along with a measure of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial
risk. To construct this measure, I used quarterly state-level per capita propri-
etary income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1969Q1 to 2001Q4.
No earlier quarterly state-level data on proprietary income are available. To
capture risk at the business cycle- frequency, I considered growth rates over
two-year horizons (growth rates over longer or shorter horizons give very
similar results). I then formed the idiosyncratic component of this growth
rate for each state by deducting the growth rate of U.S.-wide per capita
proprietary income. The measure plotted in ﬁgure (2) is the cross-sectional
standard deviation of these state-speciﬁc growth rates for each period.
Visual inspection suggests an important link between these two time se-
ries. The correlation coeﬃcient is 0.41 and the t−statistics of the regression of
cpy on the cross-sectional standard deviation is higher than 4. This suggests
that cpy captures an important element of the cross-sectional heterogeneity
in the economic situation of proprietor-run businesses in the United States.
103.3 cpy as the transitory component of proprietary in-
come
The cointegrating relation between consumption and proprietary and other
income allows to identify permanent and transitory components of these vari-
ables without further identifying restrictions. To describe the joint dynamics
of proprietary income, other income and consumption, I now estimate a coin-
tegrated VAR (VECM) in which I impose the cointegrating vector estimated
before. I include one lagged diﬀerence of xt in each equation, as suggested
by standard information criteria. The results, reported in table (3), are,
however, not very sensitive to the number of lags chosen.
A ﬁrst impression of the role of transitory components in explaining con-
sumption, proprietary and other income can be gleaned from the coeﬃcient
on the lagged cointegrating residual: if this coeﬃcient is zero, the respective
variable does not contribute to the error-correction mechanism, implying that
it does not contribute to the predictable dynamics that forms the transitory
component of the system.
Inspection of the VECM coeﬃcients reveals that only the adjustment co-
eﬃcient on proprietary income is signiﬁcant, suggesting that the transitory
dynamics in consumption and income is largely due to deviations of propri-
etary income from its long-run trend. I further examine this proposition by
identifying the permanent and transitory components of c, p,a n dy more
formally.
I do this in two ways. First, I build on a recent literature inspired
by Gonzalo and Granger (1995), Johansen (1997) and Proietti (1997) in
which the permanent and transitory components of a cointegrated system
are expressed as the linear combination of current levels. In this way, time
series for the trend and cycles of c, p,a n dy are easily obtained. Speciﬁcally,
Proietti proposes the following decomposition:






where C(1) is the long-run response of xt to shocks, i.e. the loading as-
sociated with the random walk component in the Beveridge-Nelson-Stock
Watson decomposition of xt.
An alternative approach that allows me to obtain variance decompositions
is to identify permanent and transitory shocks directly. A natural way to do






11can be interpreted as the vector of permanent shocks, the innovations to the
random walk component of xt. By construction, shocks that are transitory
with respect to all components of the vector xt must be orthogonal to πt so






















it is straightforward to identify the variance contribution of permanent and
transitory shocks as well as impulse responses.
Figure (3) plots the trend components of consumption, other income,
and proprietary income along with the variables themselves. As is apparent,
again, proprietary income is the one variable in the system with a sizeable
transitory component, whereas other components of income as well as con-
sumption are always much closer to their random walk components. This
message also transpires from the variance decompositions in table (4).1 This
result is very much in line with the ﬁndings obtained by Cochrane (1994) as
well as Lettau and Ludvigson (2004): both studies ﬁnd consumption to be
close to a random walk. Lettau and Ludvigson also demonstrate that labour
income displays almost random-walk behaviour, whereas Cochrane ﬁnds that
the consumption -income (as measured by GNP) ratio predicts changes in
income. The results here identify proprietary income as an important source
of this predictability.
Note that our measure of other income, besides labour income, also in-
cludes income from assets such as interest payments and — in particular —
corporate dividends. Cochrane (1994), Campbell (1991) and others have
f o u n dt h a td i v i d e n dg r o w t hi sh a r d l yp r e d i c t a b l e ,a n dm yr e s u l tt h a tt h e
sum of labour income and dividends is hardly predictable seems to line up
1Note that the relative variance contributions of permanent and transitory shocks do
not require any further identiﬁcation of the permanent or transitory among themselves.
This will only be necessary once we are interested in conducting impulse response analysis.
See e.g. Hoﬀmann (2001)
12with these ﬁndings. Very recently, however, Lettau and Ludvigson (2003,
forthcoming) have argued that the consumption wealth ratio does predict
dividend growth. The next section reports long-horizon regressions that also
show that cpy predicts dividend growth. It would therefore seem surprising
that the predictability of dividend growth does not materialize in temporary
variation of the ’other income’ aggregate. I discuss this issue below, but it
should be noted that the facts reported here just imply that the adjustment
coeﬃcient on cpy in the ’other income’-equation of the VECM is zero. Hence,
other forms of income — and in particular dividends — do not enter the error-
correction mechanism between consumption and the components of personal
income in U.S. data. The ﬁndings to be reported below are consistent with
this interpretation, even though I also ﬁnd dividends to be predictable.
The results here may also raise the question why proprietary income is
the main predictable component of personal income in U.S. data. A poten-
tial explanation may be that proprietary income is the least smoothed of
all components of personal income: labour income may be insured through
migration, through labour hoarding over the cycle or through unemploy-
ment beneﬁt systems. Also, there is evidence that corporations smooth div-
idend payments, (Cochrane (1994), Lamont (1998)) implying a similar kind
of smoothing for income derived from ﬁnancial assets. Proprietary income,
however, is a residual that acts as a buﬀer for income ﬂuctuations over the
business cycle and as such it also has the biggest cyclical component. This
interpretation underscores the interpretation of cpy as a distress factor. It is
also in line with the ﬁnding by Agronin (2004) who reports that the degree
of aggregate risk sharing over the business cycle is highly correlated with
cyclical ﬂuctuations in the share of proprietary income in GDP.
The ﬁndings reported here suggest that consumption-income and the con-
sumption wealth ratio are highly positively correlated and — read together
with those in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) — they imply that transitory
movements in asset prices are positively associated with transitory ﬂuctua-
tions in proprietary income. One may therefore expect cpy to be a good
predictor for asset returns. I turn to a discussion of the forecasting power of
cpy for stock market returns in the next section.
4 Predicting stock market returns
The previous section has established that temporary ﬂuctuations in the cpy-
relation largely reﬂect temporary ﬂuctuations in proprietary income. To
the extent that cyclical variation in proprietary income is an indicator of
uninsurable background risk, cpy should therefore help to predict excess stock
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Table 5 provides results from univariate long horizon regressions of excess
returns on stock market wealth onto the cpy residual. Panel I of table 5
reports long-horizon regressions of excess returns in the Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) 500 index on cpy. The temporary component of proprietary income
signiﬁcantly predicts excess returns at horizons of two years and beyond. The
associated R2coeﬃcients at the two year horizon are 0.10. But the forecasting
power of cpy seems to be concentrated at longer horizons, at the 6 year (24
quarters) horizon, cpy accounts for more than ﬁfty percent in the variability
of excess returns.
Panel II reports the same univariate regressions, but now based on excess
returns on the CRSP index. The CRSP is a much broader index than the
S & P .W h i l et h ep a t t e r no fr e s u l t si se x a c t l yt h es a m ea st h a to b t a i n e df o rt h e
S&P, it is noteworthy that the associated t-statistics and R2 measures are
somewhat lower throughout than for the S&P. While this result should not
be overemphasized, it is consistent with an interpretation of cpy as a measure
of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk once one recognizes that excess returns on
the S&P 500 are slightly less volatile than are those on the CRSP index: since
proprietors have larger background risk than the average investor, their stock
portfolios should be biased towards a narrower group of standard shares that
may be slightly less risky. Note also that all coeﬃcients are positively signed,
consistent with the uninsurable background risk story: cpy and expected
returns are positively correlated, so that proprietary income below trend
predicts rising expected returns.
4.1 Comovement with corporate earnings and dividends
Proprietary income could of course help to predict stock market returns
for reasons that are unrelated to the background-risk and non-participation
mechanism that provides the motivation for this paper. First, proprietary
income could be correlated with corporate earnings over the business cycle.
Secondly, proprietary income is the dividend from proprietary wealth, so one
may expect a correlation with corporate dividends. I explore both of these
mechanisms in turn.
The ﬁrst of these mechanisms can easily be ruled out: the results in panel
III of table 5 suggest that cpy does not predict aggregate earnings of S&P
500 companies. Only at the six year horizon would the relationship appear
marginally signiﬁcant.
Interestingly, while cpy cannot predict earnings, it does predict corporate
dividends: panel IV of the same table shows long horizon regressions of
dividend payments on the S&P 500. The cpy residual has predictive power
14for dividend growth at business cycle frequencies, i.e. horizons from 3-6 years.
This result seems remarkable since dividend growth has generally been found
hard to predict by ﬁnancial variables, at least over longer horizons. Only
recently some authors, notably Lettau and Ludvigson (2003) have started to
report that dividend growth does indeed seem predictable at business cycle
frequencies from variables such as the consumption income ratio. Lettau and
Ludvigson (2003) identify a cointegrating relationship between consumption,
corporate dividends and labour income and ﬁnd dividends to be predictable
a tt h es a m eh o r i z o n sa sId o .
T h ef a c tt h a tIﬁnd dividends to be predictable may however seem par-
ticularly surprising since my measure of other income, y, includes dividend
payments and since the results in the previous section showed that the load-
ing coeﬃcient of y on the cointegrating relationship cpyt is insigniﬁcant in
the VECM. This suggests that cpy does not predict other income as a whole.
Long horizon regressions of other income on cpyt (not reported) reveal the
same outcome.
To explore this issue further, I construct a measure of ‘other income’
exclusive of dividends. Excluding dividend payments does not change the
results for the cointegrating relations or for the VECM: cointegration tests
still reveal a cointegrating relationship between c, p,a n dy and the coin-
tegrating relationship mainly reﬂects error correction in proprietary income.
Still, this alternative measure of cpy predicts dividend growth in long-horizon
regressions. Furthermore, using the broader concept of dividends from the
BEA personal income tables rather than just the dividend data strength-
ens the results. In the long-horizon regressions in Panel V, the dependent
variable is personal dividend income from the national income and product
accounts and cpy is constructed without dividend income. In this regressions,
d i v i d e n d sa r ep r e d i c t a b l ee v e na th o r i z o n sa sl o wa s2y e a r s .
As shown in Lettau and Ludvigson (2003), dividends also have some
forecasting power for excess returns. So it could indeed be the case that
proprietary income predicts stock returns only because it is incidentally cor-
related with corporate dividend payments. To address this issue, I follow
Lettau and Ludvigson (2003) and consider a cointegrating relationship be-
tween consumption, dividend income and labour income. My estimate of this
cointegrating relationship is
cdyt = ct − 0.21dt − 0.68yt
and again in analogy to Lettau and Ludvigson I refer to it as cdy.A ss h o w n
in Lettau and Ludvigson, ﬂuctuations in this cointegrating relationship can
largely be associated with ﬂuctuations in dividends, a result also borne out
in my data, when I estimate a VECM in ∆c, ∆d,a n d∆y.
15I then regress excess returns and dividends on both cpy and cdy. These
results are reported in table 6: when considered individually, cdy has forecast-
ing power for both dividends (ﬁrst regression in panel I) and excess returns
(ﬁrst regression in panel II) at horizons beyond 2 years. This is very similar
to the ﬁndings reported by Lettau and Ludvigson.
When cpy is added as a second regressor, cdy continues to predict divi-
dends at rather short horizons (panel I). But panel II also clearly shows that
cdy becomes insigniﬁcant in the forecasting regression for stock returns at all
horizons. The adjusted R2-measure for this regression is almost identical to
the one obtained from the univariate regression of excess returns on cpy alone
that was reported in table 5, panel I and a lot higher than that attained for
cdy alone. Interestingly, cpy is now signiﬁcant at all horizons.
The results in this subsection show that, while cpy is correlated with
dividends over the business cycle, variation in dividends is not the source of
t h ep r e d i c t i v ep o w e ro fcpy for stock returns. The ability of cpy to predict
stock returns by far exceeds that of cdy even though cdy is a better predictor
of dividends.
4.2 How much of the predictive power of the consumption-
wealth ratio can cpy explain?
The empirical fact that the consumption-wealth ratio (cay) predicts excess
returns is consistent with a broad range of economic models that all allow
to rationalize time variation in expected returns. In this section, I address
the question to what extent variation in entrepreneurial background risk — as
measured by the transitory component of proprietary income — can explain
the predictive power of the consumption-wealth ratio. In table 7, I therefore
turn to multivariate long horizon regressions of excess returns on the S&P500
on cpyt and cay along with other usual suspect forecasting variables.2 It is
well known that the consumption-wealth ratio crowds out the forecasting
power of purely ﬁnancial forecasting variables. I therefore also assess to
what extent this is the case for cpy.
Panel I, reports long-horizon regressions that, besides cpy, also include
the cay residual as regressor. The consumption wealth ratio is signiﬁcant
at virtually all horizons, in line with the ﬁndings reported by Lettau and
Ludvigson. But note that cpy, as the transitory part of proprietary income,
continues to be signiﬁcant at horizons of 3 years and beyond. The relative
increase in the R2 measure associated with the inclusion of cay into the
regression decreases with the horizon. Whereas including cay in the set of
2The results for the CRSP are very similar and I therefore do not report them here.
16regressors increases the explanatory power of the regression sixfold at the
one quarter horizon (relative to the regression including only cpy in table
5, panel I), adding cay does not seem to make a diﬀerence at the 4-6 year
horizon.
To answer the question how much more information is contained in cay
than in cpy, panel II of table 5 represents the results of a regression of excess
returns on cpy along with the usual suspect forecasting variables, plus a
variable deﬁned as res. This is the residual from the regression of cay on
cpy. This regression is highly signiﬁcant but it only explains around 20
percent of the variability of cay, implying that the consumption wealth ratio
reﬂects much more than just ﬂuctuations in proprietary income.
The usual suspects forecasting variables included into the regressions
reported in panel II of table 6 are the dividend-price ratio, the dividend-
earnings (payout) ratio as well as the cyclical (HP-detrended) component of
the T-bill rate. The ﬁrst feature that is apparent from the results in panel
II of table 6 is that the usual suspects virtually add no information vis-a-vis
the regressions in panel I. Virtually all coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant, with the
notable exception of the payout ratio that appears just about signiﬁcant at
the six year horizon.
The second notable feature of the results is that replacing cay with res
makes cpy signiﬁcant at all horizons, but so remains res. On the one hand,
this suggests that temporary ﬂuctuations in proprietary income are an im-
portant source of time varying risk premia, possibly because ﬂuctuations in
the level of aggregate income from entrepreneurship go in hand with ﬂuctu-
ations in non-insurable background risk. On the other hand , the very fact
that res adds important information at all forecasting horizons also implies
that the background risk associated with entrepreneurial income cannot be
the entire story in rationalizing the size and variability of excess returns: at
short horizons, cpy is clearly outperformed by cay.
5 The changing link between entrepreneurial
risk and the stock market
The results in the previous sections support the notion that ﬂuctuations in
aggregate proprietary income are an indicator of entrepreneurial risk and
that this factor is important in explaining the equity premium in the United
States. However, the impact of entrepreneurial risk on aggregate pricing
relations is likely to have changed over the sample period: the late 1970s and
early 1980s mark a decline in the correlation between cpy —t h et r a n s i t o r y
17part of proprietary income — and cay — the transitory part of stock market
wealth. The correlation between cay and cpy for the pre-1980 part of our
sample is 0.69, that for the post-1980 period is only 0.21. In this section, I
examine how two important developments are likely to have contributed to
this decline in correlation.
The ﬁrst of these developments is that household access to stock markets
has been gradually widening since the early 1980s: the share of households
owning stocks increased from 19% in 1983 to 49.5% in 2002. As argued by
Poterba (1994), an important driver behind the increase in household stock
ownership was the growth of (employer-sponsored) 401(k) plans as a form of
retirement savings. According to Poterba, the number of households owning
401(k) plans rose from 4.4 million in 1983 to 20.4 million in 1993 and equity
accounts for a large share of the assets under administration in 401(k) plans.3
A c c o r d i n gt ot h e2 0 0 2Equity Ownership in America survey, 33.2 million
households owned stock mutual funds within employer-sponsored retirement
plans in 2002. Since by deﬁnition only employees are eligible for such plans,
the role of proprietary income for the average stock owning household is likely
to have declined.
A second development that is likely to have aﬀected the role of proprietary
income as a factor in explaining aggregate stock returns is that proprietary
income has — at least in part — become more diversiﬁable through state level
banking deregulation. Small, owner-run businesses are particularly depen-
dent on bank-intermediated ﬁnance. As argued in Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996), the removal of branching and interstate ownership restrictions on
banks has led to a more eﬃcient allocation of capital and better risk sharing
between banks. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) present evidence that these
eﬃciency gains are likely to have been passed on to banks’ customers. Bank
loans eﬀectively work as a risk sharing device since they allow the ﬁrm to
smooth temporary ﬂuctuations in cash ﬂow. Recent results by Demyanyk,
Ostergaard and Sørensen (2004) show that state level personal income has
indeed become less sensitive to state level shocks after banking deregulation.
They also show that this decline in the sensitivity of state-level personal
income is driven mainly by a decline in the sensitivity of the proprietary
income component of personal income. They ﬁnd the decline in the sensitiv-
ity of state-level personal income to idiosyncratic output shocks to be more
marked in states with a higher incidence of small businesses. This suggests
that in particular small businesses have beneﬁted from banking deregulation
through better access to borrowing facilities. This, in turn, has made propri-
3Poterba and Wise (1998) estimate that this share was between 40 and 60 percent in
1995.
18etary income risk more easily diversiﬁable. For the analysis in this paper this
should imply that in the wake of bank deregulation, proprietary income risk
should have become less important in explaining stock market risk premia.
From eyeballing the raw data and the trend components in ﬁgure (3),
it is also apparent that the decline in the correlation between cay and cpy
coincides with a shift in the trend of proprietary income: after 1980, the
average growth rate of proprietary income is 2.9 percent per year, compared
to an annual 0.7 percent for the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h es a m p l e .T h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n
I wish to propose here is that this trend break is associated with state level
bank deregulation: if the risks of entrepreneurial activity becomes more easily
diversiﬁable, one would expect more entrepreneurial activity and ultimately
higher growth rates in proprietary income.4 While cpy is the temporary
deviation of proprietary income from its trend, this trend seems to have
shifted due to banking deregulation and the correlation between cpy and
stock markets has decreased.
To illustrate this point, I proxy the trend in proprietary income by scaling
a linear trend with the exponential of the cumulative share of federal states
t h a th a df u l l yd e r e g u l a t e da tag i v e nd a t e .Il a b e lt h i ss c a l e dt r e n dv a r i a b l e
CUMDEREG.5 Figure (4) plots the raw series of proprietary income, the
ﬁtted value of the regression of proprietary income on a linear trend and
the ﬁtted value of a regression on CUMDEREG. By way of comparison,
the ﬁgure also replicates the stochastic trend obtained from the cointegrated
VAR that already appeared in ﬁgure (3). During the period of banking
deregulation, i.e. mainly the 1980s and early 1990s6, CUMDEREG does
a good job at capturing the shift in the stochastic trend estimated earlier.
The same message comes from Figure 5 that plots the normalized residual
of the regression on CUMDEREG along with the normalized cpy residual:
excluding observations after 1990, the correlation between the two time series
is 0.74. The correlation over the 1980s alone, i.e. the period during which
4Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that states that personal income at the state level
grew faster after banking deregulation.
5Speciﬁcally, CUMDEREG constructed as follows: I obtain data on state level bank-
ing deregulation from table (1) in Demyanik, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2004). For each
state, this data set contains the year of intra-state branching deregulation as well as the
year of liberalization of interstate bank holding regulation. This allows me to obtain a
time series for the percentage of federal states that had fully deregulated in a given year.
To obtain a quarterly series, the observations for each quarter are then set equal to the
annual percentage, so that a step function is obtained. I then construct CUMDEREG as
the exponential of this step function multiplied with a linear trend.
6The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 allows interstate branching and banking. Even though
individual states were allowed to opt out from this federal legislation, only very few states
did so, implying that most states had eﬀectively deregulated by the mid-990s.
19most federal states deregulated, is even higher at almost 0.9.7
To develop an idea of the joint importance of the two developments -
increasing stock market participation and state level banking deregulation
for the link between cay and cpy, I calculate a time series of moving-window
correlations between these two residuals. I refer to this time series as CORR.8
Figure (5) plots CORR along with cay and cpy. The marked decline in the
correlation between cay and cpy after1980 shows up very clearly. But it is
also worth noting that the correlation also slowly increases again after 1990.
In a next step, I run various regressions of CORR on the share of states
that had deregulated at a given time and on a second variable, the share
of U.S. households owning stocks.9 Note that the deregulation variable is
based on the year in which a state fully completed deregulation. Hence, the
eﬀects of deregulation on the correlation between cpy and cay are likely to be
felt well ahead of the deregulation variable actually registering an increase. I
therefore use an 8 quarter lead instead of the contemporary value of this vari-
able in this regression, the results of which are summarized in table (8). The
ﬁrst two columns report separate regressions of CORRon the banking dereg-
ulation and participation variables. In both cases, the coeﬃcients are signed
as expected and highly signiﬁcant, the regression on the deregulation variable
alone explains more than 40 percent of the variability in CORR.T h et h i r d
column reports the multiple regression of CORR on both the deregulation
as well as the participation variables. Now, the adjusted R2 reaches more
than 80 percent. Again both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient
on stock market participation suggests that increasing stock market partici-
pation increases rather than lowers the correlation between cay and cpy.I n
the data, the increase in the correlation between cay and cpy towards the end
of the sample period coincides with the bull market of the 1990s, a period
7While CUMDEREG has a permanent eﬀect on the trend growth rates of proprietary
income, it can only in part account for the continued high growth of proprietary income
after the completion of banking deregulation in the early 1990s. But note that banking
deregulation is likely to continue to lead to changes in market structure in the banking
sector even after it is formally completed. Therefore, the impact of banking deregulation
on trend growth in proprietary income is also likely to continue, at least for a while.
Numbers from the Small Business Administration, lending to small businesses continued
to expand substantially throughout the 1990s. Clearly, by the very way it is constructed,
the variable CUMDEREG cannot capture this eﬀect.
8The correlation is taken over twenty quarters respectively so that CORRt =
corr(cayt−40:t,cpy t−40:t).
9Data on the percentage of U.S. households owning stocks is available on an irregular
basis from Equity Ownership in America (ICI and SEA 2002). I used observations for
1983, 1996, 1999 and 2002 which I then linearly interpolated. Observations before 1983
were set to the observation for 1983.
20in which venture capital and other forms of small business ﬁnance saw a big
boom. The generally favorable climate in ﬁnancial markets could therefore
have interacted with improved ﬁnancing conditions for small businesses. To
capture this idea, I therefore also include an interaction term between stock
market participation and banking deregulation in the regression reported in
column (4). Again, all coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant, the adjusted R2
exceeds 0.9, but now the coeﬃcient on the stock market participation trend
is negative as expected, while it is now the coeﬃcient on the interaction term
that, indeed, captures the increase in CORR throughout the 1990s.
Figure (6) plots the ﬁtted value of this last regression against CORR.
The simple model does very well in capturing the decline of CORR and its
subsequent recovery. To allow for the possibility that CORR as well as the
two regressors are non-stationary but cointegrate, I also conducted a unit-
root test on the regression residual. These tests lead me to reject the unit
root, suggesting that — if characterized as a unit-root process — CORR would
indeed seem to cointegrate with the two trend variables.
The main result of this section is that the decline in the correlation be-
tween cpy and cay after 1980 can be statistically associated with the growth
of stock market participation and with improvements in small ﬁrms’ access
to credit markets and therefore to insurance. This strengthens the interpre-
tation of the ﬁndings in this paper in the light of the entrepreneurial income
risk mechanism: this mechanism eﬀectively interacts two theoretical ingredi-
ents - limited participation in stock markets and non-insurable background
risk for those households that participate. Entrepreneurial income risk ap-
pears to have played an important part in explaining variations in expected
U.S. stock market returns over the post war period. But as access to stock
markets has widened and as proprietary income risk has become more di-
versiﬁable in the wake of banking deregulation, the mechanism has become
somewhat less important — very much as economic theory would suggest.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has identiﬁed proprietary income as a major predictable com-
ponent of personal income in U.S. data. Transitory variation in proprietary
income is highly correlated with ﬂuctuations in the consumption-wealth ratio
and has considerable predictive power for excess stock market returns as well
as for dividends.
What drives these results? A simple explanation could be that propri-
etary income is likely to be highly correlated with corporate earnings over the
business cycle. But I ﬁnd earnings are hardly predictable from the tempo-
21rary component of proprietary income as it is identiﬁed in this paper. While
proprietary income, as the dividend from proprietary wealth, comoves sub-
stantially with corporate dividends, it substantially outperforms dividends
in predicting stock returns. Furthermore, the cyclical variation of aggregate
proprietary income is highly correlated with the cross-sectional variance of
growth rates in proprietary income at the federal state-level. One way in
which I suggest to interpret the present set of ﬁndings is as evidence for a
model of asset prices in which entrepreneurial risk drives variation in risk
aversion and hence risk premia.
Since the work of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004), it is known that the
ratio between consumption and aggregate wealth has considerable forecasting
power for excess returns on stocks. This ﬁnding raises the question what the
theoretical levers are that can explain temporary ﬂuctuations in asset prices:
is it habit formation as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or is the story one
of uninsurable background risk, as in Heaton and Lucas (2000)?
While I ﬁnd that temporary ﬂuctuations in proprietary income are an
important source of variation in the aggregate consumption wealth ratio, the
temporary component of proprietary income cannot completely drive out the
consumption wealth ratio as a predictor of excess stock returns. In particular,
the consumption-wealth ratio outperforms proprietary income at rather short
horizons, whereas proprietary income matters most at horizons of 3 to 6 years.
This suggests that uninsurable background risk - even when coupled with
limited stock participation, as is in the case in the entrepreneurial background
risk mechanism — cannot be the entire story of why risk premia ﬂuctuate over
the business cycle. Furthermore, the predictive power of proprietary income
for stock returns has decreased in line with wider access of private households
to stock markets and with better access of small business to insurance through
bank loans.
T h er e s u l t si nt h i sp a p e ra l s oc o n t r i b u t et oar e c e n tl i t e r a t u r et h a th a s
started to uncover important transitory components in dividend growth at
the business cycle frequency. Lettau and Ludvigson (2003) have identiﬁed a
cointegrating relationship between consumption, dividend and labour income
and ﬁnd that the cointegrating residual does indeed predict dividend growth
at horizons between three and six years. Their ﬁndings help to understand
why the dividend-price ratio typically fails to predict changes in dividends
at the business cycle frequency: both dividends and excess returns covary
positively at the business cycle frequency and these eﬀects seem to oﬀset
in the dividend price ratio. Using the temporary component of proprietary
income as a forecasting variable, the present paper comes to very similar
conclusions.
One interesting novel feature of the results presented here is that the
22f o r e c a s t i n gv a r i a b l eIu s ed o e sn o ti n c l u d et h ep a s to ft h ev a r i a b l et h a ti st o
be predicted: the approximation of the consumption wealth ratio used by
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001, 2004) reﬂects an ingenious way of identifying
the transitory component of stock market wealth using a theory-based vari-
able. The same is true of the consumption-dividend income ratio. But both
cay and the consumption-dividend income ratio (cdy) are themselves func-
tions of stock market prices and dividends respectively. Proprietary income,
however, is not by construction a function of either stock market prices or
dividends. This feature makes the ﬁndings in this paper informative with
respect to the particular transmission mechanism between the consumption-
wealth ratio and risk premia in ﬁnancial markets.
6.1 Summary
This paper has shown that the transitory part of proprietary income has had
considerable predictive power for excess returns in the U.S. stock market
over much of the postwar period. Proprietary income also predicts dividends
but not corporate earnings at business cycle frequencies. Over the postwar
period, its ability to forecast excess stock returns considerably exceeds that
of corporate dividends. At the same time, the cyclical component of pro-
prietary income correlates negatively with cross-sectional measures of entre-
preneurial risk. These ﬁndings are consistent with the mechanism suggested
by Heaton and Lucas (2000a, 2000b): proprietary income is an important
source of non-insurable background risk for those (generally wealthy) house-
holds that participate in the stock market. To the extent that ﬂuctuations
in average proprietary income capture ﬂuctuations in entrepreneurial risk,
they are therefore likely to enter aggregate asset pricing relations. The evi-
dence reported in this paper also suggests that the role of the entrepreneurial
background risk mechanism in explaining stock returns has decreased to the
extent that stock market participation of private, non-proprietor households
in the U.S. has widened and to the extent that state-level banking deregula-
tion has facilitated the sharing of proprietary income risk. To my knowledge,
my results constitute the ﬁrst time-series evidence on the role of this mech-
anism in postwar U.S. stock markets.
An alternative way to read the paper is as an attempt to quantify econo-
metrically to what extent the predictive power of the consumption wealth ra-
tio for equity premia can be explained by one particular mechanism that has
attracted a lot of attention in the recent literature. My ﬁndings suggest that
entrepreneurial risk can explain a considerable amount of the predictable vari-
ation at horizons beyond three years but that it fails to explain predictable
variation at very short horizons. Additional mechanisms, such as habit for-
23mation along the lines of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) are therefore likely
to be needed to explain the forecasting power of the consumption-wealth
ratio for excess returns on stocks.
The ﬁndings in this paper are also potentially useful for our understanding
of the allocation of consumption risk across U.S. regions. Agronin (2004)
reports that consumption risk sharing among U.S. federal states decreases
during booms and increases during recessions. He identiﬁes imperfect sharing
of proprietary income risks as the main source of this variation. My ﬁndings
here suggest that proprietary income is indeed the most volatile component
of personal income in US aggregate data and that the distress factor cpy
correlates with the dispersion of entrepreneurial income growth across U.S.
federal states. It will be interesting to investigate to what extent cpy can
explain business cycle variation in interstate consumption insurance. I leave
this for future research.
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where RC,t+s is the gross return on total wealth. This expression can be writ-
ten recursively as
Ψt+1 = RC,t+1(Ψt − Ct)
which allows to use the approach adopted by Campbell and Mankiw
(1989) for the log-linearization of the consumption-wealth ratio:
Ψt+1
Ψt
= RC,t+1(1 − exp(ct − ψt))
Taking logs yields
∆ψt+1 = rc,t+1 +l o g ( 1− exp(ct − ψt))
The logarithmic term can now be expanded around the long-run consumption-
wealth ratio exp(c − ψ) so that
log(1 − exp(ct − ψt)) = log(1 − exp(c − ψ)) +
−exp(c − ψ)
(1 − exp(c − ψ))
£




(1 − exp(c − ψ))
[ct − ψt]
where
κC =l o g ( 1− exp(c − ψ)) +
exp(c − ψ)
(1 − exp(c − ψ))
c − ψ
Write ∆ψt+1 tautologically as
∆ψt+1 = ∆ct+1 − (ct+1 − ψt+1)+( ct − ψt)
to obtain







= ∆ct+1 − (ct+1 − ψt+1)+( ct − ψt)




[ct − ψt]=rc,t+1 − ∆ct+1 − (ct+1 − ψt+1)
28which, can be solved forward with ρk









c [rc,t+1 − ∆ct+1]
If consumption and wealth are both integrated (I(1)) process, then ∆c
will be stationary. Assuming that returns are also stationary, the right hand
side of this present-value relation reﬂects the discounted sum of stationary
variables and will therefore be stationary. Hence, ct − ψt is stationary.
Applying the same log-linearization procedure to pt − πt,a n dyt − θt,I
get





c (∆ct+k − rC,t+k) (5a)





p (∆pt+k − rP,t+k) (5b)





y (∆yt+k − rY,t+k) (5c)
where ρx is the mean reinvestment ratio of the respective wealth compo-
nent, e.g. ρc =1−exp(c − ψ).Plugging into (4) one then obtains the desired
relation between c, p and y.
Note that rC,t+k can be interpreted as the return on total wealth, which
is the weighted average of returns on proprietary and other forms of wealth,
so that approximately
rC,t+k ≈ γrP,t+k +( 1− γ)rY,t+k (6)
To see that cpy must be a cointegrating relationship, plug in relations (5)
and (6) into the linearized budget constraint (3). Then rearrange the forward
looking terms to the right so that







































From this representation it is apparent that cpy must be stationary: since
c,p and y are all best characterized as individually I(1), the present value of
29their changes must be stationary. If the returns on wealth are stationary, then
their discounted sum must equally be stationary. This implies that cpy will
be stationary. It therefore deﬁnes a cointegrating relationship that measures
the temporary deviation of consumption, proprietary and other income from
the common trends.
The deviation of the cointegrating relation from its long-run mean then
predicts changes in either consumption or in one of the two components of
income: away from the long-run trend, at least one of the three variables will
have to adjust.
30Data Appendix
Consumption. My source is NIPA table 1.5.5 ’Gross Domestic Prod-
cut: expanded detail’. I follow Lettau and Ludvigson in the construction
of the consumption aggregate: nondurables consumption is constructed as
consumption expenditure on nondurable goods (line 7) and services (line
12) less less expenditure on shoes and clothing (line 9). Total consumption
expenditure also includes expenditure on durables (line 3).
Proprietary and other income. T h ed a t as o u r c ei sN I P At a b l e2 . 1
’Personal Income and its disposition’. My measure of entrepreneurial income
is non-farm prorietary income inclusive of rents (lines 11 and 12). Other
income includes compensation of employess received (line 2), income from
assets (line 13) and transfers (line 16). I obtain dispsoable income measures
as follows: disposable proprietors’ income = proprietors’ income - (personal
income-disposable income) x proprietors income/personal income. And dis-
posable other income = other income - (personal income-disposable income)
x other income/personal income.
Consumption Deﬂator, population data. As consumption deﬂa-
tor I use the index of personal consuption expenditure PCE.P o p u l a t i o ni s
from NIPA table 2.1 ’Personal Income and its disposition’, line 41.
Stock market data and T-bill rates. The data on the S&P500 is
from Robert Shiller’s homepage http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
As a broader index, I also use the CRSP’s value-weighted index. Excess re-
turns are constructed using the 3 months T-Bill-rate from the Federal Reserve
Board.
Data on banking deregulation and household stock ownership.
Data on banking deregulation are obtained from table (1) in Demyanik, Os-
tergaard and Sørensen (2004). Data on household stock ownership have been
linearly interpolated from numbers given in the 2002 Equity Ownership in
America Survey and various sources cited there.
Consumption wealth ratio. As measure of the aggregate consump-
tion wealth ratio, I use the cay-residual kindly provided on Martin Lettau’s
web page: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~mlettau/
31Table 1: Tests for cointegration
Trace Test Max.EigValue
# of cointegrating relations statistics 95% CV statistics 95% CV
P a n e lI :N o n - D u r a b l e sC o n s u m p t i o n
h =1 42.01 31.25 34.13 21.27
h =2 7.97 17.84 7.82 14.59
h =3 0.15 8.08 0.15 8.08
P a n e lI I :T o t a lC o n s u m p t i o n
h =1 31.9736 22.9592
h =2 9.0145 8.9895
h =2 0.0250 0.0250
Table 2: estimated cointegrating vectors
Non-Durables Consumption Total Consumption
Johansen Dynamic OLS Johansen Dynamic OLS
βc 11 1 1
βp -0.2697 -0.2713 -0.2578 -0.2623
βy -0.8099 -0.8148 -0.7606 -0.7641




. The estimate from the
Johansen-procedure is based on a VECM with one lagged diﬀerence term and an unrestricted intercept.




where k =3leads and lags have been chosen.
32Table 3: Estimated VECM
Equation
∆ct ∆pt ∆yt
∆ct−1 0.2576 0.9249 0.6808
(3.4969) (3.0775) (4.5223)
∆pt−1 0.0144 0.1538 -0.0602
(0.7874) (2.0646) (-1.6123)
∆yt−1 0.0487 -0.0659 0.0252
(1.1738) (-0.3890) (0.2976)
cpyt−1 -0.0216 0.3388 0.0355
(-1.2518) (4.8105) (1.0066)





NOTES: t-statistics in parentheses, coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at the 5% level are in bold-face.
cpy = c − 0.2713p − 0.8148y.
Table 4: Variance decompositions
Variance share of transitory component
Horizon k in quarters
1248 1 21 62 4
ct+k − Et(ct+k) 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.003
pt+k − Et(pt+k) 0.64 0.52 0.42 0.32 0.25 0.19 0.13
yt+k − Et(yt+k) 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
33Table 5: Univariate Long-horizon regressions on cpy
Pk
l=1 ∆qt+l = δkcpyt + µk + vkt
Horizon k in quarters
1 2 4 8 12 16 24
Panel I: excess returns on S&P500 - ∆qt+l = rt+l − r
f
t+l
δk 0.36 0.67 1.38 3.47 6.06 7.82 12.48
t-stat (1.33) (1.34) (1.43) (2.53) (3.98) (4.76) (5.88)
R2 [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.10] [0.25] [0.35] [0.52]
x
Panel II: excess returns on CRSP - ∆qt+l = rt+l − r
f
t+l
δk 0.47 0.79 1.28 3.22 5.41 6.87 10.83
t-stat (1.67) (1.43) (1.23) (2.11) (3.28) (4.20) (5.23)
R2 [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.09] [0.21] [0.30] [0.46]
Panel III: Earnings on S&P 500 - ∆qt+l = ∆et+l
δk -0.38 -0.54 -0.21 1.27 2.74 3.20 4.46
t-stat (-1.65) (-1.09) (-0.21) (0.90) (1.87) (1.78) (2.26)
R2 [0.02] [0.01] [-0.004] [0.01] [0.05] [0.06] [0.12]
Panel IV: Dividends on S&P 500 - ∆qt+l = ∆dt+l
δk 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.90 1.72 2.21 3.37
t-stat (0.09) (0.29) (0.74) (1.76) (2.47) (2.56) (3.05)
R2 [-0.01] [-0.004] [0.002] [0.06] [0.13] [0.17] [0.26]
P a n e lV :P e r s o n a lD i v i d e n dI n c o m e-∆qt+l = ∆dt+l, cpy constructed without d
δk 0.12 0.27 0.58 1.41 2.17 2.50 3.63
t-stat (1.47) (1.68) (2.26) (3.02) (3.92) (3.23) (3.88)
R2 [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.14] [0.23] [0.24] [0.35]
NOTES: OLS regressions. t−statistics are based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors based on Newey and West (1987), using a window width of k +1 .
34Table 6: Long-horizon regressions on cpy and cdy
Pk
l=1 ∆qt+l = δkcpyt + γkcdyt + µk + vkt
zt Horizon k in quarters
1 2 4 8 12 16 24
Panel I:Dividend growth — ∆qt = ∆dt
cdy 0.20 0.42 0.89 1.73 2.59 3.31 4.23
(2.44) (2.76) (2.97) (3.44) (4.60) (5.62) (8.06)
R2 [0.04] [0.09] [0.17] [0.28] [0.39] [0.50] [0.58]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––—
cpy -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.66 1.17 1.04 1.65
(-0.07) (-0.24) (0.27) (1.32) (2.31) (1.50) (2.53)
cdy 0.20 0.44 0.86 1.42 2.02 2.79 3.40
(2.20) (2.56) (2.53) (2.49) (3.06) (3.69) (5.53)
R2 [0.04] [0.09] [0.16] [0.30] [0.43] [0.52] [0.62]
Panel II: Excess returns — ∆qt+l = rt+l − r
f
t+l
cdy 0.04 0.05 -0.22 -0.32 1.19 3.10 6.11
(0.20) (0.14) (-0.30) (-0.24) (0.91) (1.96) (2.62)
R2 [-0.01] [-0.01] [-0.004] [-0.004] [0.01] [0.07] [0.18]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––—
cpy 0.76 1.32 2.52 5.67 7.54 7.85 10.78
(2.23) (2.00) (1.91) (2.69) (3.27) (3.95) (4.62)
cdy -0.27 -0.51 -1.35 -2.96 -2.50 -0.82 0.66
(-1.10) (-1.11) (-1.48) (-1.92) (-1.76) (-0.55) (0.38)
R2 [0.01] [0.03] [0.05] [0.17] [0.27] [0.32] [0.47]
NOTES: see table 5
35Table 7: Long-horizon regressions of returns on cpy, cay and ’usual suspects
Pk




zt Horizon k in quarters
1 2 4 8 12 16 24
Panel I: cpy and cay alone
cpy 0.11 0.10 -0.09 1.10 3.52 5.89 9.52
(0.35) (0.18) (-0.10) (0.86) (2.28) ( 3.16) (4.05)
cay 1.45 2.94 5.96 9.21 9.16 7.93 9.35
(3.06) (3.44) (3.73) (4.81) (3.37) (1.87) (2.06)
R2 [0.06] [0.11] [0.21] [0.34] [0.41] [0.45] [0.56]
Panel II: cpy, res and Usual Suspects
cpy 0.56 1.00 1.68 3.76 6.13 7.98 10.92
(2.22) (2.12) (2.02) (3.23) (4.37) (5.59) (6.14)
res 1.44 2.92 5.92 8.96 8.89 7.96 11.11
(2.87) (3.23) (3.65) (3.83) (2.58) (1.82) (2.53)
d − p 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.01 0.01 0.21
(0.14) (0.11) (-0.03) (-0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (1.22)
d − e -0.006 -0.009 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.55
(-0.19) (-0.16) (0.17) (0.47) (0.46) (0.75) (2.37)
T − bill -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.10
(-1.19) (-1.14) (-0.36) (1.57) (1.09) (0.50) (0.99)
[0.06] [0.11] [0.20] [0.35] [0.41] [0.45] [0.61]
NOTES: res is the residual of a regression of cay on cpy. d − p and d − e denote the
dividend-price and the dividend-earnings ratio respectively and T-bill is the cyclical component of the
three months treasury-bill rate obtained through an HP-ﬁlter with λ =1 6 0 0 .F o rf u r t h e rn o t e ss e e
previous tables.
36Table 8: Determinants of the declining correlation between cay and cpy
Regressions of the form CORRt = θ
0zt + vt
zt Estimates of θ (dep. variable always CORRt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full banking deregulation -0.016 – -0.05 -0.176
(-3.27) (-6.03) (-16.53)
stock market participation – -0.04 0.17 -0.738
(-2.28) (4.63) (-8.16)
interaction term – – – 0.0080
(10.82)
constant 1.94 2.56 -1.19 16.10
(14.77) (4.96) (-1.69) (9.26)
R2 0.46 0.19 0.80 0.91
NOTES: t-stats in parentheses, based on robust standard errors based on Newey and West (1987).










Figure 1: cpy = c − 0.27p − 0.81 versus Lettau-Ludvigson (2004) cay.









x-sectional std. deviation     
of proprietary income      
across U.S. federal states 
Figure 2: cpy (1969-2002) vs. the cross-sectional variance of growth rates in
proprietary income across U.S. federal states.























Consumption: data and trend  Proprietary Income: Data and trend (das
 
Other Income: Data and Trend (dashed) 
Figure 3: (Logarithmic) Data (solid line) vs their trend components (dashed)
as identﬁed from the VECM.














stochastic trend in prop. inc 
Figure 4: The ﬁgure plots proprietary income, the stochastic trend identiﬁed
from the VECM and the ﬁtted value of the regression of p on the banking
deregulation trend CUMDEREG.










Main Period of Banking Deregulation 
Figure 5: cpy versus the residual of the regression on p on the banking
deregulation trend CUMDEREG.









Figure 6: Rollling window correlation CORRt = corr(cayt−20:t,cpy t−20:t)
(solid line). Thin lines reproduce cay and cpy respectively.













Figure 7: Rolling-window correlation CORR (solid line) and the ﬁtted value
of the regression of CORR on the banking deregulation and stock market
participation measures and the interaction term. See regresssion (4) in table
8 for details. CORR has been normalized by its standard deviation over the
sample period.
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